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clusivity period to the first generic com-
pany to file a paragraph IV certification, 
blocking any other generic companies 
from marketing the same drug during this 
time.4  Once a paragraph IV certification 
is filed, the brand company has forty-five 
days to file suit against the generic for 
patent infringement.5  As a benefit to the 
brand company, FDA will refuse to grant 
the generic company market approval of 
the generic drug for thirty months starting 
from the initiation of  this litigation.6 
In the early 2000s brand and generic 
companies began to use so-called “reverse 
payments” as part of paragraph IV litiga-
tion settlements.  Reverse payments occur 
when the brand company pays the generic 
company, either in money or some form 
of other consideration, to delay launch of 
the generic drug until shortly before the 
patent expires.7  Because the brand drug 
remains the only available option for con-
(‘Reverse Payments,’ Continued on page 10) 
approval.2  Generally the generic company 
must also file a paragraph IV certification 
along with the ANDA, stating that it will 
not infringe upon the brand company’s 
patent or that the brand company’s patent 
is invalid.3  FDA will grant a 180-day ex-
Roundtable consisted of a coalition of 
different organizations and individuals, 
including scientists, academics, health and 
research organizations, food manufactur-
ers, and retailers.5  At this Roundtable, the 
idea of making the “Nutrition Facts panel 
more relevant and meaningful to consum-
ers emerged as a topic of focus.”6  Dis-
cussing this concept “led to a discussion 
of front-of-pack (FOP) nutrition labeling 
and the need for a uniform FOP nutrition 
labeling program to help bring consistency 
and clarity to the marketplace.”7   
As a result of this discussion, the 
Roundtable developed the Smart Choices 
name and logo.8  If a food group is ap-
proved, it receives two SCP labels: one is 
“a green checkmark symbol indicating that 
a food bearing the checkmark has met 
certain nutrient criteria; the other states 
the number of calories per serving and the 
number of servings in the package.”9  The 
SCP website states that “the uniform and 
(‘Smart Choices,’ Continued on page 7) 
certain products Smart Choices.  They ask 
whether alternative regulatory measures by 
the government may, in fact, be more ap-
propriate. 
The Origins and Details of Smart 
Choices Self-Regulation 
In 2006, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and the Department of Health and 
Human Services recommended that food 
companies “explore labeling initiatives, 
including icons and seals, to identify lower-
calorie, nutritious foods clearly and in a 
manner that does not mislead consum-
ers.”3  In response, many companies began 
self-regulating their products, but their 
standards and symbols were not uniform.  
In 2007, the Keystone Center, a nonprofit 
health group, recognized this national issue 
of labeling confusion and assembled a 
Food and Nutrition Roundtable to 
“explore science-based nutrition labeling 
solutions to help improve the American 
diet and enhance public health.”4  This 
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Reverse Payments Reduce the 
Drug Price Competition Intended by 
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments 
Congress enacted the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restora-
tion Act (Hatch-Waxman Act) in 1984 to 
help reduce the cost of pharmaceutical 
drugs by encouraging the entry of generic 
drugs into the market.1  Under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, a generic drug company 
may file an Abbreviated New Drug Ap-
plication (ANDA) with the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), which re-
quires submission of significantly less 
safety and efficacy data than is required 
by a brand drug in order to get market 
Self-Regulation in the Food    
Industry  
Nicole Hamberger 
nicole.hamberger@gmail.com 
Lucky Charms, Froot Loops, Ritz 
Bits Peanut Butter Chocolatey Blast 
Crackers—historically, children had to 
persuade hesitant parents to put these 
items in the grocery cart.1  Today, these 
and many other sugary, highly processed 
foods are granted the coveted “Smart 
Choices” check mark, indicating to con-
sumers that they have made a nutritious 
food choice.2  But whose standards indi-
cate whether or not food options are 
“smart”? 
“Smart Choices” products are self-
regulated by the Smart Choices Program 
(SCP).  Many individuals and entities 
alike, however, question the merit of the 
SCP and worry that misrepresentation 
and misconceptions arise from labeling 
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The Effect of Transparency Re-
form on “Big Business” and 
“Small Patient”  
Sarah Geers 
sarah.geers@student.shu.edu 
The current legislative focus on 
healthcare reform has seemingly pitted 
the “small patient,” who is facing ever-
increasing healthcare costs and perhaps a 
lack of healthcare coverage altogether,1 
against “big business,” a healthcare in-
dustry whose profits are apparently at the 
expense of patients who depend on it for 
their very wellbeing.2  In the midst of this 
adversarial reform climate, one proposal 
stands to benefit both sides: the addition 
to current measures increasing healthcare 
access of transparency requirements for 
pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs). 
Introduction to Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers (PBMs) 
Pharmacy benefit managers act as a 
species of “middleman” in the drug sup-
ply chain linking pharmaceutical manu-
facturers to patients.  Specifically, PBMs 
link pharmaceutical manufacturers, phar-
macies, and benefit providers.3  They 
contract with manufacturers on behalf of 
benefit providers to obtain brand name 
and generic drug coverage.4  In addition, 
they contract with retail or mail-order 
pharmacies to provide access to these 
drugs for benefit provider plan enrol-
lees.5  PBMs managed drug benefits for 
fifty-seven percent of the U.S. popula-
tion in 2004.6 
In negotiating these relationships, 
PBMs do more than act as an intermedi-
ary; they perform several other functions 
that have subjected their role to scrutiny: 
☼  Development of formularies, 
including generic and therapeutic substi-
tution.  PBMs primarily use formularies, 
or lists of PBM-approved drugs, to man-
age benefits for benefit providers.7  In 
effect, PBMs will rank available prescrip-
tion drugs by desirability, with some ex-
cluded altogether from the formulary, and 
will price patient co-pays accordingly.8  
Generally, PBMs utilize a three- or four-
tiered co-pay arrangement, with associated 
co-pays increasing in each tier: (1) generic 
drugs; (2) brand-name drugs with no ge-
neric equivalents; (3) brand-name drugs 
with generic equivalents; and (4) option-
ally, as negotiated by the benefit provider 
plan, drugs excluded from the formulary, 
such as lifestyle drugs.9  In addition to 
saying “yes” or “no” to a particular phar-
maceutical treatment option and setting 
the patient price accordingly, PBMs also 
exercise considerable power over how a 
pharmacy fills a particular individual pre-
scription.10  PBMs can direct pharmacies 
to substitute generic versions of drugs for 
brand-name prescriptions, without need-
ing physician approval, or to substitute 
therapeutically distinct but equivalent (and 
likely less expensive) drugs, subject to 
physician authorization.11  By providing 
significant “pocketbook” incentives for 
patients filling pharmacy prescriptions to 
switch to less expensive alternatives, 
PBMs manage the costs of the benefit 
providers’ prescription benefits. 
☼  Negotiation of rebates and down-
stream payments.  PBMs also negotiate 
payment streams with pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, retail pharmacies, and 
benefit providers.  First, PBMs negotiate 
with pharmaceutical manufacturers for 
“rebates” of portions of the Average 
Wholesale Price (AWP)—the “sticker 
price”—for drugs included on a PBM’s 
formulary.  The PBM will negotiate an 
AWP rebate based on “(a) a percentage of 
AWP or some other wholesale bench-
mark, (b) achieving certain specified sales 
or market share targets, (c) preferred 
placement of certain drug products on the 
PBM[’s] formulary,” or a combination of 
these.12  The PBM will also incorporate 
AWP rebates into its agreements with 
pharmacies and the benefit providers.  For 
example, the PBM will reimburse the 
pharmacy at a price that reduces AWP by 
some rebate, offset by a dispensing fee, 
e.g., “AWP minus % rebate plus $ dispens-
ing fee.”13  The size of this rebate will 
depend in part on the exclusivity of the 
relationship (i.e., the size of the resulting 
retail pharmacy network) and the number 
of benefit providers associated with the 
PBM.14  With respect to the benefit pro-
viders, the PBM will pass along some of 
these rebates but incorporate an additional 
administration charge to cover other ser-
vices the PBM provides, e.g., “AWP minus 
% rebate plus $ administration fee.”15  
Each of these fee structures are negotiated 
separately with each entity, and rebates are 
not currently disclosed.16 
☼  Other functions: Mail-order ser-
vices, claims adjudication, and quality-
focused programs.  In addition to these 
primary functions, PBMs also provide 
ancillary services to benefit providers and 
patients.  Most PBMs offer mail-order 
(‘Managing PBMs,’ Continued on page 12) 
Managing Pharmacy Benefit Managers  
The rebate and payment negotiation relationships among PBMs, pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers, benefit providers, pharmacies, and consumers. 
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Court Takes Control in the OTC 
Switch of Plan B  
Diana Giampiccolo 
diana.giampiccolo@student.shu.edu 
The Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) has struggled with the question of 
whether to allow the over-the-counter 
sale of the Plan B emergency contracep-
tive to young women.1  On March 23, 
2009, after six years of debate, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York finally ordered 
FDA to make Plan B available to women 
age seventeen and older without a pre-
scription.2  In a fifty-two page opinion, 
Judge Edward R. Korman scolded FDA 
for allowing the White House’s political 
agenda to trump the scientific evidence 
that clearly showed over-the-counter 
Plan B to be safe for women age seven-
teen and over.3  Following Judge Kor-
man’s decision, a number of religious 
groups sought leave to challenge the 
outcome,4 but these groups were ulti-
mately found to lack standing to inter-
vene.5  The disagreement over Plan B 
sparks a fundamental question: is the 
court’s intervention in ordering drug 
regulations appropriate when scientific 
findings and political agendas collide? 
Plan B, commonly known as the 
“morning-after pill,” is a type of contra-
ception that is taken after sexual inter-
course to prevent unwanted pregnancy.6  
Initially, the drug was available only by 
prescription.7  In August 2006, however, 
FDA approved the switch to non-
prescription use of Plan B for women 
eighteen and over, which allowed women 
to obtain Plan B upon consultation with 
a pharmacist, also known as “behind the 
counter” (BTC).8  Judge Korman’s ruling 
“ [ I ] S  T H E  C O U R T ’ S 
INTERVENTION IN ORDERING 
D R U G  R E G U L A T I O N S 
APPROPRIATE WHEN SCIENTIFIC 
FINDINGS AND POLITICAL 
AGENDAS COLLIDE?” 
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did not alter the BTC requirements, but 
simply lowered the minimum age for ob-
taining the drug from eighteen to seven-
teen.9 
The Role of FDA Generally 
The public relies on FDA to make 
informed decisions about drug regula-
tions.  The basis for these decisions is 
codified in 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) of the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)—
to protect and promote the public 
health.10  But, despite their efforts to re-
main a neutral body, FDA faced pressure 
from the White House and from certain 
religious groups to deny making Plan B 
available without a prescription.11  Thus, 
given the highly sensitive nature of emer-
gency contraception, FDA veered sharply 
away from its normal procedure.12 
Before the implementation of the 
BTC regime, drugs were either available 
by prescription or over the counter 
(OTC).13  FDA has distinct protocol in 
place for all prescription-to-OTC switches 
to ensure that the scientific evidence is 
evaluated objectively.14  According to the 
FDCA, a drug can be sold without a pre-
scription when the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services finds that a prescrip-
tion requirement is not necessary for the 
protection of public health.15  The switch 
can occur either by a regulation promul-
gated by FDA at the request of FDA 
commissioner or of an interested citizen, 
or alternatively, a drug sponsor can re-
quest a switch, whereby rulemaking is 
unnecessary.16  The Commissioner may 
also delegate the switch operations to 
FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research (CDER).17  The Director of the 
CDER will seek the help of agencies 
within its control and advice from outside 
experts and has the ultimate decision of 
whether to approve a switch.18 
The Role of FDA—and the Court—
in the Plan B Switch 
As Judge Korman outlines in his 
opinion, politics and protocol collided in 
the Plan B switch recommendations.19  
On February 14, 2001, a Citizen Petition 
was submitted to FDA asking for a com-
plete OTC switch of Plan B without age 
restrictions.20  Although FDA recognized 
that there was sufficient data to approve 
the switch, then-FDA Deputy Commis-
sioner Dr. Lester Crawford and Commis-
sioner Dr. Mark McClellan later testified 
that at the time, discussions regarding the 
“political sensitivity” of the possible 
switch of Plan B pervaded the decision 
process.21  Judge Korman notes that testi-
mony of FDA officials reveals that politics 
and ideology played a “determinative role” 
in choosing members for the advisory 
committee that would ultimately decide 
whether to approve the Plan B switch.22  
The Advisory Committee nonetheless 
approved the Plan B switch.23  The FDA, 
however, did not follow its advice.24  
Judge Korman points out that “the FDA 
has followed advisory committee recom-
mendations in every OTC switch applica-
tion in the last decade.”25  Judge Korman 
further references similar occurrences 
within FDA over the subsequent five 
years, which indicated that the agency 
continued to deviate from its routine pro-
tocol.26  Even when the drug was made 
available for OTC use to women eighteen 
and over, it was still placed behind the 
pharmacy counter, so that women who 
purchased the drug were monitored.27 
(‘Pregnant with Power,’ Continued on page 9) 
Pregnant with Power  
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Physician Disclosure of Medical 
Errors  
Neelu Pal 
neelupal@hotmail.com 
Imagine this scenario: a patient visits 
the hospital and undergoes a cardiac 
procedure.  He is discharged a few days 
later.  He continues to have some diffi-
culties, and his cardiologist does an out-
patient echo-cardiogram, which reveals a 
collection of blood adjacent to the heart.  
The patient is brought back to the oper-
ating room, where a small incision is 
made below the xiphoid process and a 
catheter advanced in an attempt to 
“suction” out this blood.  Massive bleed-
ing is encountered and the patient ex-
pires on the operating room table.  
What should the physician tell the 
patient’s wife and daughter who are in 
the waiting room?  
New Jersey’s Patient Safety Act 
The Patient Safety Act (PSA),1 a 
landmark piece of legislation passed in 
2004, changed the paradigm for dealing 
with medical errors and serious adverse 
events in New Jersey.  Previously limited 
to an ethical responsibility, the legislation 
created a legal duty to disclose medical 
errors to patients or their surviving fami-
lies in the event of death.2 
The PSA falls within the rubric of 
the so-called “apology laws,” which pre-
vent the use of expressions of regret, 
condolences, and sympathy from use as 
evidence of admission of guilt in subse-
quent litigation.3  At least four other 
states have mandated disclosure of medi-
cal errors to patients.4  Of the fifty states 
and the District of Columbia, thirty-six 
have enacted “apology laws” protecting 
voluntary disclosures of medical errors.5 
The PSA defines an “adverse event” 
as an event that is “a negative conse-
quence of care that results in unintended 
injury or illness, which may or may not 
have been preventable.”7  A “serious, pre-
ventable adverse event” is defined in the 
PSA as “an adverse event that is a pre-
ventable event and results in death or loss 
of a body part, or disability or loss of bod-
ily function lasting more than seven days 
or still present at the time of discharge 
from a health care facility.”8 
The legislature stated that its intent in 
mandating disclosure of serious, prevent-
able adverse events was to “increase the 
amount of information on systems fail-
ures, analyze the sources of these failures 
and disseminate information on effective 
practices for reducing systems failures and 
improving the safety of patients.”9  Thus, 
the patient must be informed of any seri-
ous preventable adverse events before the 
end of the episode of care, or in a timely 
manner if the error is discovered after the 
episode of care has ended.10  In addition, 
the Department of Health and Senior 
Services (DHSS) must be notified of the 
occurrence of the error.11 
In August 2006 the legislature clari-
fied some of the ambiguous provisions of 
the PSA and the penalties resulting from 
non-compliance.12  Physicians or medical 
providers are required to notify a patient 
of a medical error within twenty-four 
hours of its discovery.13  The patient must 
be notified by telephone or certified mail 
or in person if he is still at the facility.14  
The disclosure must be documented in the 
patient’s chart along with details of date, 
time, the persons informed, and the 
names of all individuals present at the 
time the disclosure was made.15  A report 
to DHSS must be made within five days 
of the occurrence or discovery of the ad-
verse event.16  Specific details that must be 
included in the report to DHSS include (a) 
the date and time the event occurred, (b) a 
brief description of the event, (c) a state-
ment about the impact of the event on the 
health of the patient, (d) the date and time 
the facility became aware of the event, (e) 
how the event was discovered, (f) the im-
mediate corrective actions the facility took 
to eliminate or reduce the adverse impact 
of the event on the patient, and (g) what 
steps were taken to prevent the occur-
rence of future similar events.17 
The Act penalizes non-compliance by 
healthcare facilities at a rate of $1000 per 
day.18  Medical providers are fined $1000 
for disclosing to neither the patient nor 
DHSS.19  But if there is no disclosure to 
the patient, while a disclosure was made to 
the Department, the fine increases to 
$5000.20 
An Ethical Responsibility  
The American Medical Association 
Code of Ethics describe the doctor-
patient relationship as one that is “based 
on trust and gives rise to physicians’ ethi-
cal obligations to place patients’ welfare 
above their own self-interest and above 
obligations to other groups and to advo-
cate for their patients’ welfare.”21  The 
clinical encounter between a patient and a 
doctor is described as “fundamentally a 
moral activity that arises from the impera-
(‘To Tell or Not to Tell,’ Continued on page 7) 
To Tell or Not to Tell—That Is the Question  
“OF THE FIFTY STATES AND THE DIS-
TRICT OF COLUMBIA, THIRTY-SIX 
HAVE ENACTED ‘APOLOGY LAWS’ 
PROTECTING VOLUNTARY DISCLO-
SURES OF MEDICAL ERRORS.” 
Type of Disclosure 
Legally Protected 
Explanation6 
Sympathy only 
Protects physician expressions of sympathy, regret, and 
condolence 
Admission of fault 
Protects physician admissions of fault and error, as well 
as expressions of sympathy, regret, and condolence 
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twelve grams of sugar per serving.14  Sec-
ond, SCP items must “provide positive 
attributes” that individuals are encouraged 
to consume; these include “nutrients to 
encourage,” if healthy vitamins or minerals 
are contained in the item, or “food groups 
to encourage,” if a 
desirable food 
group can be 
found in the 
item.15  Examples 
of “nutrients to 
encourage” are 
Vitamin A and 
calcium; examples 
of “food groups to 
encourage” are 
whole grains and 
vegetables.16 
Fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables 
without any additives are automatically 
deemed Smart Choices.17  However, nine-
teen other food categories are considered 
for Smart Choices labeling by the pro-
gram, including “cheese and cheese substi-
tutes; snack foods and sweets; fats, oils 
and spreads.”18  According to Marion 
Nestle, Nutrition Professor at New York 
University, “[t]he object of this is to make 
highly processed foods appear as healthful 
as unprocessed foods, which they are 
not.”19 
Kraft Foods, Kellogg’s, PepsiCo, and 
General Mills are among the ten compa-
nies who have signed up for the SCP, 
paying up to $100,000 per year to partici-
pate.20  Over two thousand products have 
been deemed Smart Choices as of Sep-
tember 29, 2009; the expectation is that 
this total will soon double.21 
(‘Smart Choices,’ Continued on page 8) 
recognizable nutrition symbol and calorie 
information that can be identified at-a-
glance on the front of packages can help 
guide consumers’ food choices at the 
point of purchase and in their homes.”10 
The standards used in evaluating 
SCP food items were to be derived from 
“a comprehensive set of qualifying nutri-
tion criteria derived from . . . the Dietary 
Guidelines for Americans, FDA stan-
dards, reports from the Institute of Medi-
cine and other sources of authoritative 
dietary guidance.”11  First, SCP items 
“must meet specific nutritional bench-
marks.”12  Under this requirement, food 
items may not surpass the maximum rec-
ommended amount of certain “nutrients 
to limit” which include “total fat, satu-
rated fat, trans fat, cholesterol, added 
sugars and sodium.”13  For example, a 
product may not contain more than 
‘Smart Choices,’ Continued 
tive to care for patients and to alleviate 
suffering.”22  Based on the principles that 
trust and patient-welfare are central to the 
physician-patient relationship, the Ameri-
can Medical Association Code of Ethics 
states that physicians have an ethical obli-
gation to advise patients of the occur-
rence of a significant medical error when 
“a patient suffers significant medical 
complications that may have resulted 
from the physician’s mistake or judg-
ment.”23  The American College of Sur-
geons endorses in its Code of Profes-
sional Conduct that surgeons “fully dis-
close adverse events and medical er-
rors.”24  The American College of Physi-
cians’ Ethics Manual also directs physi-
cians to disclose errors if disclosure of 
this information is “material to the pa-
tient’s well-being.”25 
Similarly, many organizations that 
oversee healthcare entities support disclo-
sure of errors and adverse events.  In 
2001, the Joint Commission issued the 
first nationwide disclosure standard, 
which required that patients be informed 
about all outcomes of care, including 
“unanticipated outcomes.”26  The 
standard did not specify the content 
of disclosure, nor did it mandate 
that patients be told when unantici-
pated outcomes were due to error.27  
In 2006, the National Quality Fo-
rum endorsed full disclosure of 
“serious unanticipated outcomes” as 
one of its thirty “safe practices” for 
healthcare.28  In legally mandating 
these standards in the form of the 
PSA, the New Jersey legislature 
stated that “[h]ealth care facilities 
and professionals must be held ac-
countable for serious preventable 
adverse events.”29  The necessity of 
a law to supplement an ethical obli-
gation implies that the ethical im-
perative alone has been inadequate 
in creating this accountability. 
The Gap Between Ideals and Reality  
Most patients harmed by medical er-
rors are never told that these errors have 
occurred.  Interviews and surveys regard-
ing error disclosure have shown that pa-
tients want to be informed of errors in 
their medical care, to receive an explana-
tion of the occurrence of the errors, and 
to learn how recurrences will be pre-
vented.31  Physicians agreed with disclo-
sure, but indicated that they “choose their 
words carefully” when telling patients 
about errors.32 
(‘To Tell or Not to Tell,’ Continued on page 14) 
‘To Tell or Not to Tell,’ Continued 
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‘Smart Choices,’ Continued 
Supporters of Smart Choices 
Those who support Smart Choices 
believe that it will aid a fast-paced society 
in making better food choices “in a way 
that reflects how people really shop.”22   
Michael Hughes of the Smart Choices 
Board states that while it might be opti-
mal to have salad for dinner, “that’s not a 
choice everyone will make.”23  Therefore, 
“consumers’ desires for taste” must be 
considered.24  The easily-identifiable la-
beling potentially allows consumers to 
make efficient shopping selections that 
favor healthier food choices. 
Critics of Smart Choices  
The Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) is one organization that is skepti-
cal of the SCP’s methodology.25  On 
August 19, 2009, the FDA and Depart-
ment of Agriculture sent SCP a letter, 
stating their intent “to monitor and 
evaluate” the SCP system due to various 
concerns.26  For example, FDA con-
sumer research found that FOP labels 
make people less likely to consult back or 
side labeling.27  Therefore, “both the 
criteria and symbols used in [FOP] and 
self-labeling systems [must] help con-
sumers make healthy food choices.”28  
The letter stated that it would focus on 
evaluating whether SCP’s criteria were 
“stringent enough to protect consumers 
against misleading claims.”29  The letter 
further stated that the groups would 
monitor to see if labels “were inconsis-
tent with the Dietary Guidelines for 
Americans; or had the effect of encour-
aging consumers to choose highly proc-
essed foods and refined grains instead of 
fruits, vegetables and whole grains.”30 
Others also question the misleading 
and possibly fraudulent nature of the pro-
gram.31  Michael Jacobson, Executive Di-
rector of the Center for Science in the 
Public Interest, once served on the Smart 
Choices nutritional criteria panel.32  He 
quit after realizing that the panel was 
“dominated by members of the food in-
dustry, which skewed its decision.”33  Cru-
cially, Jacobsen said that the criteria per-
mit foods that contain added nutrients to 
bear the Smart Choices seal.  This “could 
mask shortcomings in the food”—such as 
bread made with no whole grain but with 
added nutrients—that qualifies for the 
Smart Choices seal.34  Jacobsen also ques-
tioned the practice of permitting Smart 
Choices labels on “both regular and light 
mayonnaise, which could lead consumers 
to think they are both equally healthy.”35 
Some question the propensity to-
wards self-regulation in general.36  Com-
mentators in the New England Journal of 
Medicine have said that “self-
regulation . . . could go far toward im-
proving the healthfulness of foods sold” 
but only if it does “not displace meaning-
ful external regulation.”37  Furthermore, 
they insisted, “some forms of communica-
tion may impede rather than facilitate 
informed choices.”38 
Negative press on the SCP has led to 
institutions wishing to disassociate their 
names from the program.39  While mem-
bers who sit on the Smart Choices Board 
come from the American Dietetic Asso-
ciation, the American Diabetes Associa-
tion, and Tufts University’s School of 
Nutrition, each of these institutions has 
asked that Smart Choices remove their 
institution’s names from its website, so as 
not to be affiliated with SCP.40 
Alternative Regulation: The FDA 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA) of 1938 broadly delegated the 
authority of the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to regulate food labels to 
the FDA.  The FDCA permits the FDA 
to regulate “any vitamin, mineral, or other 
nutrient required to be placed on the label 
and labeling of food under this Act . . . if 
the [FDA] determines that such informa-
tion will assist consumers in maintaining 
healthy dietary practices.”41  Furthermore, 
the FDA “may by regulation require any 
information required to be placed on the 
label or labeling . . . to be highlighted on 
the label or labeling by larger type, bold 
type, or contrasting color if the [FDA] 
determines that such highlighting will 
assist consumers in maintaining healthy 
dietary practices.”42  The FDCA also de-
mands that labels not be “misleading.”   
To decide if labels are misleading, “there 
shall be taken into account (among other 
things) not only representations made or 
suggested by statement, word, design, 
device, or any combination thereof, but 
also the extent to which the labeling or 
advertising fails to reveal [material] 
facts.”43  A violation of the FDCA thus 
gives the FDA extensive power to correct 
such mislabeling. 
Therein lies one problem with SCP: a 
label providing only caloric content, serv-
ing size, and whether a food is a good 
source of something does not provide a full 
spectrum of nutritional information to the 
consumer.  The SCP labels products with 
added minerals as Smart Choices.  Ac-
cordingly, the public may choose a food 
otherwise devoid of nutrients and packed 
with empty calories—its only benefit be-
ing added minerals—and may detrimen-
tally rely on the assumption that it has 
health benefits based on the SCP label.  
To prevent this, a food label should be 
forced to disclose that while minerals are 
added to the product, so are negative 
items like refined sugars.  It should also 
(Smart Choices,’ Continued on page 9) 
“THEREIN LIES ONE PROBLEM WITH 
[THE SMART CHOICES PROGRAM]: A 
LABEL PROVIDING ONLY CALORIC CON-
TENT, SERVING SIZE, AND WHETHER A 
FOOD IS A GOOD SOURCE OF SOME-
THING DOES NOT PROVIDE A FULL 
SPECTRUM OF NUTRITIONAL INFOR-
MATION TO THE CONSUMER.” 
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FDA’s deviation from its routine proto-
col, the court also noted that Plan B is 
available in most other industrialized na-
tions without a prescription or age restric-
tion—that is, without a BTC restriction.32  
Because FDA acted inconsistently with 
the scientific evidence of Plan B’s safety, 
and because other scientifically advanced 
countries find no problem with unre-
Because of the abnormal delays and 
inconsistent protocol used in the Plan B 
switch, the district court, under the 
power granted by the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA),28 overruled FDA’s 
refusal to provide non-prescription ac-
cess to Plan B to seventeen-year-old 
women.29  According to § 706(2)(A) of 
the APA, the court may so act when it 
concludes that an agency’s findings are 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
the law.”30  Throughout his decision, 
Judge Korman was unwavering in his 
opinion that the delay in FDA’s decisions 
as to the supplemental new drug applica-
tions submitted by the Plan B manufac-
turer were a direct result of political in-
terference, instead of being rooted in 
scientific evidence.31  In addition to 
stricted sale of Plan B, the court surmised 
that FDA’s determination that it needed 
to restrict the sale of Plan B was arbi-
trary.33  In order to strike a balance be-
tween FDA’s concern and the citizens 
who demand no point-of-sale restrictions 
for the drug, the court ordered that Plan B 
should be made available behind-the-
counter to women age seventeen and 
older.34 
Opposing Views of These Roles 
While Judge Korman and others view 
political interference in the OTC switch of 
Plan B as disgraceful, certain religious 
groups and opponents of more liberal 
access to the drug find Judge Korman’s 
(‘Pregnant with Power,’ Continued on page 10) 
‘Pregnant with Power,’ Continued 
disclose that there are sources by which 
one can find minerals from naturally 
occurring products, such as fruits, vege-
tables, or whole grains, that lack those 
added sugars (or other negative added 
items).  Obviously, this much informa-
tion on a FOP labeling scheme seems 
impractical.  But not only is it unfair to 
include only the positive aspects of a 
product without the whole picture of a 
product, it also violates the FDCA. 
In addition, the FDCA requires                
“[p]rominence of information on [a] 
label.”44  The Act states that “if any 
word, statement, or other information 
required by or under authority of this Act 
[that] appear[s] on the label or labeling is 
not prominently placed thereon with such 
conspicuousness (as compared with other 
words, statements, designs, or devices, in 
the labeling) and in such terms as to ren-
der it likely to be read and understood by 
the ordinary individual under customary 
conditions of purchase and use” the item 
will be deemed misbranded.45  The FDCA 
further mandates that the “serving size 
which is an amount customarily consumed 
and which is expressed in a common 
household measure that is appropriate to 
the food” be provided on a food label.46    
While the number of servings in a con-
tainer is prominently posted on SCP prod-
ucts, the size of the serving is not.  The 
average consumer, however, may bypass 
this pertinent information on the back of 
a product when they see only FOP label-
ing on a SCP product.  Accordingly, serv-
ing size should be posted alongside the 
number of servings so that one bowl of 
cereal does not inadvertently turn into 
three bowls, effectively tripling the allow-
able sugar content of a “Smart Choice.” 
A new FDA-regulated food system 
for front-of-package labeling may be the 
best solution to ensure that uniform, accu-
rate, and equitable nutritional information 
is provided to the public.  Since the FDA 
does not have a profit-based relationship 
with food companies, it may be a more 
equitable rule maker for nutritional stan-
dards than is the SCP program.  Since 
companies must pay to be a part of the 
SCP, an FDA-regulated system may also 
ensure access to smaller food companies 
that perhaps could not afford SCP’s bene-
fits.  Such FDA involvement may be close 
in the future; Michael R. Taylor, a Senior 
FDA adviser, has said that the FDA 
“would consider the possibility of creating 
a standardized nutrition label for the front 
of packages.”47  The ideal labeling system 
would address the foregoing concerns and 
guide Americans to making truly 
“smarter” choices.  ☼ 
‘Smart Choices,’ Continued 
“[S]ERVING SIZE SHOULD BE 
POSTED ALONGSIDE THE NUM-
BER OF SERVINGS SO THAT ONE 
BOWL OF CEREAL DOES NOT IN-
ADVERTENTLY TURN INTO THREE 
BOWLS, EFFECTIVELY TRIPLING 
THE ALLOWABLE SUGAR CON-
TENT OF A ‘SMART CHOICE.’” 
“[T]HE DELAY IN FDA’S DECISIONS 
AS TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL NEW 
DRUG APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED BY 
THE PLAN B MANUFACTURER WERE 
A DIRECT RESULT OF POLITICAL IN-
TERFERENCE, INSTEAD OF BEING 
ROOTED IN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE.” 
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The fact that patent holders were 
paying potential infringers raised an imme-
diate red flag under antitrust law.  Patents 
by their nature create monopolies, which 
antitrust law was created to eliminate.8  In 
2003, the Sixth Circuit held that a reverse 
payment settlement agreement was a 
“horizontal agreement to eliminate com-
petition in the market” and a “classic ex-
ample of a per se illegal restraint on trade” 
in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.9  
In the years that followed, however, the 
Second,10 Eleventh,11 and Federal12 Cir-
cuits held that reverse payments are not an 
antitrust violation.  In each of these cases, 
the settlement of a patent infringement 
lawsuit involved the brand company pay-
ing the generic company millions of dol-
lars in exchange for a delay in market en-
try of the generic drug.13   
These courts reasoned that as long as 
the settlement agreement neither extends 
beyond the scope of the patent in term or 
coverage, nor manipulates the generic 
company’s 180-day exclusivity such that it 
further delays other generic companies 
(‘Reverse Payments,’ Continued on page 11) 
sumers, drug prices remain elevated until 
the generic is launched.  These settle-
ment agreements help to allocate the risk 
for both parties—the risk to the generic 
company of losing millions in patent 
infringement damages and the risk to the 
brand company of losing millions in 
higher priced drug sales made possible by 
the lack of price competition.  
Early Cases Protected Patent 
Rights Despite Anti-competitive Effect 
of Reverse Payments.  
decision to permit Plan B behind-the-
counter sale to seventeen-year-old 
women to be similarly politically driven.35  
For example, Moira Gaul of the Family 
Research Council finds that Judge Kor-
man may have allowed his own personal 
views to affect his decision.36  Gaul sug-
gests that allowing the courts to decide 
health-based issues diminishes FDA’s 
role to manage drug regulations.37  The 
Family Research Council is also con-
cerned that easier access to the drug 
could increase promiscuous behavior 
among teens.38 
In considering Judge Korman’s en-
tire opinion, it seems that Gaul fails to 
take into account the court’s deference to 
FDA.  While it is true that Judge Kor-
man ordered the BTC sale of Plan B to 
women seventeen and over without re-
manding that decision back to FDA, 
there is no indication that this decision 
lacked scientific support.  The court did 
not exercise extraordinary power or 
make the drug available to all age groups 
without a prescription; that decision was 
in fact remanded to FDA.39  Thus, Gaul’s 
assertion that the court’s decision was 
grounded in politics seems to ignore the 
scientific facts that support its decision. 
Yet Gaul is not alone in her criticism 
of Judge Korman’s decision.  Almost 
three months after Judge Korman ordered 
FDA to make Plan B available to seven-
teen-year-olds without a prescription, 
Concerned Women for American, Chris-
tian Pharmacists Fellowship International, 
and Christian Medical & Dental Associa-
tions filed for leave to intervene in the 
matter.40  The groups were outraged by 
FDA’s decision not to appeal the March 
decision and sought to assert their interest 
in assessing the safety and efficacy of the 
drug.41  The interveners also argued that 
the decision circumvented the rulemaking 
process, which would have generated the 
information that they desired regarding 
the drug.42  Judge Korman, however, de-
nied the motion for leave to intervene 
after the groups failed to establish stand-
ing within the proper timeframe.43  Fur-
thermore, Judge Korman found their ar-
gument regarding FDA’s rule-making 
process unpersuasive because it errone-
ously stated FDA’s actual policy, which 
holds that rulemaking is unnecessary when 
the process is initiated by a Citizen Peti-
tion (as was the case here).44 
Conclusion 
FDA is best equipped to evaluate the 
scientific evidence objectively in order to 
fulfill its mission to protect and promote 
the public health, but FDA must strike a 
better balance between discerning what is 
medically necessary and considering cer-
tain public demands.  If the FDA fails to 
do so, the court should exercise the power 
of review under the APA to achieve the 
best possible public health outcome.  
Whether activist groups agree with this 
specific decision regarding Plan B, it is 
reassuring to see that the system of checks 
and balances reaches all areas of our fed-
eral system.  Ultimately the court put the 
scientific evidence first, and kept the pub-
lic, rather than politics, in mind in its    
decision.  ☼ 
‘Reverse Payments,’ Continued 
“FDA IS BEST EQUIPPED TO EVALU-
ATE THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE OBJEC-
TIVELY IN ORDER TO FULFILL ITS MIS-
SION TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE 
PUBLIC HEALTH, BUT FDA MUST 
STRIKE A BETTER BALANCE BETWEEN 
DISCERNING WHAT IS MEDICALLY NEC-
ESSARY AND CONSIDERING CERTAIN 
PUBLIC DEMANDS.” 
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from launching drugs, reverse payments 
will be upheld as lawful.14  Courts deter-
mine antitrust violations of the Sherman 
Act by using the “rule of reason” analy-
sis.15  This involves a three step approach 
to determine (1) the relevant market, (2) 
whether the brand company has market 
power within the relevant market, and (3) 
whether the reverse payments have an 
adverse effect on competition in that 
market.16  If all anticompetitive effects of 
the settlement agreement are within the 
exclusionary power of the patent, mean-
ing the delay of market entry is within 
the patent term and scope, some courts 
have declined to find an antitrust viola-
tion.17  Because patent law provides an 
assumption of patent validity and be-
cause public policy strongly encourages 
litigation settlements, courts generally 
allow reverse payments as long as the 
terms of the settlement did not extend 
the anti-competitive effects beyond that 
“exclusionary zone” of the patent.18   
Although it may appear that circuits 
are split on the issue of reverse pay-
ments, it is yet to be determined whether 
the Sixth Circuit will hold all reverse pay-
ments per se illegal.  In the Sixth Circuit 
case, the agreement involved a payment 
by the brand company to the generic 
company for delay of a non-infringing 
drug product which would compete with 
the brand name drug.19  This agreement 
involved the delay of marketing a formu-
lation of the drug that was not patent 
protected but would compete with the 
brand drug.20  Such an agreement would 
be an antitrust violation even under the 
reasoning of the Second, Eleventh, and 
Federal Circuits.  But the question re-
mains as to whether the Sixth Circuit will 
consider an agreement that is within the 
“exclusionary zone” of a patent to be a 
per se violation of the Sherman Act.  
The New Administration May 
Bring Changes to Reverse Payments 
There has been recent legislation in 
response to reverse payment settlement 
agreements.  The Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act (MMA) mandates that the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) receive a copy 
of any settlement agreement between a 
brand and generic company in a patent 
infringement litigation.21  The MMA also 
has safeguards against those settlement 
agreements that try to manipulate and 
postpone the 180-day exclusivity period 
for the first generic to file a paragraph IV 
certification.22  Recently, a bill has been 
introduced into the Senate (S. 369) which 
would amend the Clayton Act so that it 
will be unlawful for anyone involved in a 
patent infringement case to (1) settle for 
anything of value and (2) delay use or 
manufacture of the drug for a period of 
time.23  This would virtually eliminate the 
ability of brand and generic companies to 
use reverse payments in patent litigation 
settlement agreements.  
In the past, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), upon invitation, has opposed cer-
tiorari in support of reverse payments.24  
Recently, however, the DOJ  has aligned 
itself with FTC stating that reverse pay-
ments should be presumptively unlawful 
because they “inappropriately permit a 
patent holder to escape the risk of patent 
invalidation and distort the statutory proc-
ess that leads to competition in the face of 
patent claims.”25  If the reverse payment 
is in excess of litigation costs, and the 
settlement agreement shortens the period 
of patent exclusivity, the defendant can 
rebut the presumption of unlawfulness 
by showing that the agreed upon entry 
date of the generic drug is that which 
would have been expected had the patent 
infringement litigation gone to judg-
ment.26  This requires an evaluation of 
the likelihood that a judgment in the 
patent litigation would have resulted in 
patent invalidity prior to patent expira-
tion.27 
The DOJ’s model is vague and un-
workable and would likely result in vari-
ous interpretations among the circuits.  It 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine whether the underlying patent 
would have been invalidated without a 
full patent infringement trial on the mer-
its.  The current analysis by the Second, 
Eleventh, and Federal Circuits allows for 
a clearer set of rules for brand and ge-
neric companies to follow when deter-
mining settlement agreements.  These 
rules also provide a fair balance of avoid-
ing unreasonable restraints on trade un-
der antitrust law while allowing patent 
monopolies.  To date, the Supreme 
Court has denied certiorari for all ap-
pealed reverse payment cases. With a 
rising trend in opposition against reverse 
payments, however, we may see the Su-
preme Court tackling this issue in the 
near future.  ☼ 
‘Reverse Payments,’ Continued 
“THE DOJ’S MODEL IS VAGUE AND 
UNWORKABLE AND WOULD LIKELY 
RESULT IN VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS 
AMONG THE CIRCUITS.  IT WOULD BE 
DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO 
DETERMINE WHETHER THE UNDERLY-
ING PATENT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN-
VALIDATED WITHOUT A FULL PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT TRIAL ON THE      
MERITS.” 
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pharmacy services that compete with 
retail pharmacies by dispensing certain 
covered prescriptions directly through 
the mail to patients, resulting in cost sav-
ings to patients and benefit providers.17  
PBMs also provide services to monitor 
and manage benefits claims, as well as 
programs to educate on disease manage-
ment, compliance strategies, and other 
patient issues, to encourage cost-
effectiveness.18 
Criticism of PBMs 
Perhaps the biggest criticism facing 
the current PBM structure is the lack of 
transparency surrounding the rebates 
negotiated among the parties.19  In es-
sence, the public wants to know how big 
of a “cut” the PBMs are getting.  Some 
argue that, armed with this information, 
benefit providers and patients will wield 
more bargaining power to negotiate 
lower drug prices.20  In response to this 
lack of transparency and regulation, 
PBMs have faced state law claims of 
unfair and deceptive practices brought by 
private parties and claims of unfair trade 
practices brought by the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and many states.21  For 
example, parties acting as “private attor-
neys general” have claimed that “PBMs 
are failing to disclose and pass on” sav-
ings to benefit providers and “are con-
tributing to the escalation in prices of 
prescription drugs by keeping the lion’s 
share of rebates,” which they believe “is 
in the billions of dollars annually.”22  A 
similar suit against Medco, brought by 
the DOJ and twenty state attorneys gen-
eral, was settled for $29 million.23  In 
total, between 2004 and 2008, the three 
largest PBMs have been subject to over 
$370 million in litigation damages over 
claims of “fraud; misrepresentation to 
plan sponsors, patients, and providers; 
unjust enrichment through secret kick-
back schemes; and failure to meet ethical 
and safety standards.”24  Several states 
have also passed legislation regulating 
PBM practices, and others have consid-
ered such regulation,25 with input from 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).26  
These actions all indicate that, in addition 
to being subject to criticisms of the lack of 
transparency generally, PBMs also suffer 
due to the negative inferences that others 
draw from this lack of disclosure. 
The Benefits of PBMs 
Despite these criticisms, PBMs have 
been successful in reducing the costs of 
drug benefits for their participating bene-
fit providers, and many have found the 
competition among PBMs sufficient to 
compensate for the lack of transparency in 
the marketplace.  For example, a U.S. 
General Accounting Office (GAO) study 
found that “[t]he average price PBMs ne-
gotiated for drugs from retail pharmacies 
was about 18 percent below the average 
cash price customers would pay at retail 
pharmacies for 14 selected brand-name 
drugs and 47 percent below the average 
cash price for 4 selected generic drugs.”27  
Thus, the negotiating power and position-
ing of the PBMs in the supply chain al-
lowed them to generate substantial savings 
for patients enrolled in benefits plans as 
compared to cash-paying patients. 
Considering this and similar evidence, 
government agencies previously have not 
found the degree of disclosure to be in-
adequate because of the ample degree of 
competition among PBMs.  An FTC and 
DOJ investigation of healthcare competi-
tion concluded that “[j]ust as competitive 
forces encourage PBMs to offer their best 
price and service combination to health 
plan sponsors to gain access to subscrib-
ers, competition also encourages disclo-
sure of the information health plan spon-
sors require to decide on the PBM with 
which to contract.”28  Likewise, in a study 
of PBMs that operate their own mail-
order pharmacy services, the FTC deter-
mined that its “data suggest that compe-
tition in this industry can afford plan 
sponsors with sufficient tools to safe-
guard their interests.”29  In this vein, 
commentators have suggested that 
“rebate transparency can be handled 
through private contracts, because there 
is no barrier to a plan sponsor negotiat-
ing an arrangement providing it with 
access to the PBMs’ rebate informa-
tion.”30  Despite these defenses of the 
PBM industry, the calls for reform have 
continued, including in the current de-
bate of broad-based healthcare reform. 
Current PBM Reform Efforts 
Recently, legislators and consumer 
groups have pushed for PBM transpar-
ency measures as part of the 2009 health-
care reform efforts partially embodied in 
the Senate’s proposed America’s Healthy 
Future Act (AHFA).31  The current pro-
posal originated in an amendment sought 
by Senator Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.),32 
which was approved by the Senate Fi-
nance Committee33 and incorporated 
into the Senate bill.34  Under the current 
Senate proposal, a PBM will be required 
to confidentially disclose information on: 
(1) The percentage of all pre-
scriptions that were provided 
through retail pharmacies com-
pared to mail order pharmacies, 
and the percentage of prescrip-
tions for which a generic drug 
was available and dis-
pensed . . . . (2) The aggregate 
amount, and the type of re-
bates, discounts, or price con-
cessions . . . that the PBM ne-
gotiates that are attributable to 
patient utilization under the 
plan, and . . . that are passed 
through to the plan sponsor, 
and the total number of pre-
scriptions that were dispensed.  
(3) The aggregate amount of 
the difference between the 
amount the health benefits plan 
pays the PBM and the amount 
that the PBM pays retail phar-
(‘Managing PBMs,’ Continued on page 13) 
‘Managing PBMs,’ Continued 
“[T]HE NEGOTIATING POWER AND 
POSITIONING OF THE PBMS IN THE 
SUPPLY CHAIN ALLOWED THEM TO 
GENERATE SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS 
FOR PATIENTS ENROLLED IN BENE-
FITS PLANS AS COMPARED TO CASH
-PAYING PATIENTS.” 
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macies, and mail order pharma-
cies, and the total number of 
prescriptions that were dis-
pensed.35 
The House of Representatives’ bill, 
the Affordable Health Care for America 
Act, incorporates similar PBM transpar-
ency provisions36 and was passed by the 
House on November 7, 2009.37  Both 
measures would only require transparency 
and rebate disclosure, not that rebates be 
passed through; however a failure to dis-
close would be enforced by the same pen-
alties that apply under the Medicare rebate 
statute,38 which may include $10,000 for 
each day that information is not provided 
or $100,000 for each item reported 
falsely.39 
Upon its proposal, the Cantwell 
amendment was supported by over thirty 
consumer, labor, and Medicare beneficiary 
groups.40  These groups wrote letters urg-
ing Senate leaders to include the amend-
ment in any final package that reaches the 
Senate,41 using such language as “[n]o 
other segment of the health care market 
has a record of such deceptive, egregious 
and anti-consumer practices.”42  This lob-
bying effort is further supported by the 
GAO’s determination that the amend-
ment would be budget-neutral, i.e., that 
the disclosure provisions would not in-
crease PBM costs that would be passed on 
to benefit providers.43  These reform ef-
forts reflect the lobbyists’ position that the 
previous reliance on competition and con-
tract bargaining to generate appropriate 
levels of transparency has been           
insufficient.   
The Business of Healthcare Reform 
Because of this relationship between 
competition and transparency, consolida-
tion in the PBM industry will influence 
efforts at reform.  In 2007, over half of all 
prescriptions filled by PBMs were filled by 
Medco, CVS/Caremark, or Express 
Scripts.44  The consolidation continued in 
2009, with Express Scripts purchasing the 
PBM division of Wellpoint (the fourth 
largest PBM by market share in 2007)45 
and Medco report-
edly leading the 
bidding on the PBM 
division of Aetna 
(the tenth largest).46  
The increased mar-
ket clout and bar-
gaining power of 
PBMs in a rapidly 
consolidating indus-
try will thus influ-
ence the ultimate 
benefits of any 
transparency meas-
ures. 
In addition, 
apart from transparency measures incor-
porated into any healthcare reform legisla-
tion that is passed, the PBMs will directly 
benefit from the expected increase in ac-
cess to medical insurance.  Robert Hodg-
son, the manager of the BlackRock 
Healthcare Fund, expects PBMs in par-
ticular among healthcare sectors to benefit 
from the AHFA:  “Someone is going to 
have to be responsible for managing the 
drug [expenditures], helping people get 
the best prices, helping [do] things by 
mail, helping—whether it’s the HMOs or 
whether it’s a government-run plan—put 
those packages and those programs to-
gether.”47  In other words, PBMs will play 
the same role in the pharmaceutical supply 
chain post-reform, but with an expanded, 
and potentially more profitable, scope. 
Creating a Win-Win for Big Busi-
ness and Small Patient 
With increased consolidation and 
expanded access to their services, PBMs 
stand to profit significantly in the near 
future.  For instance, fewer PBMs should 
give the survivors increased bargaining 
power to negotiate better rebates from 
pharmaceutical manufacturers.48  The 
increased market size will also expand the 
role of PBM services in containing costs 
and managing formularies, reinforcing 
their additional bargaining power.  It 
should also increase demand for effective 
ancillary services like mail-order pharma-
cies, claims adjudication, and quality-
focused programs, for which PBMs earn 
additional administrative fees.  Even if 
the additional transparency requirements 
result in lower margins, this would be 
offset by higher volume.  Accordingly, 
given the scope of the expected market 
expansion, it is likely that PBMs will ulti-
mately benefit from healthcare reform. 
Nonetheless, it is clearly patients and 
benefit providers who are intended to 
benefit from the Cantwell amendment’s 
transparency measures.  Transparency 
should be the price exacted—the trade-
off—for the PBMs’ increased role in the 
marketplace.  As advocates have argued, 
“A market needs three things to function 
competitively and effectively: choice, 
transparency, and lack of a conflict of 
interest.”49  If, as many expect, disclosure 
result in lower prices, this will be an im-
mediate benefit for these groups to the 
extent that disclosure increases the size 
of the rebate that is passed on to them 
without increasing the prices paid by the 
PBMs.  “If PBMs reduce drug prices, it’s 
possible—depending on their health plan 
and the company they work for—that 
some patients might pay less for 
drugs.”50  Yet despite the GAO’s deter-
mination that the measure is “budget 
neutral,”51 the Pharmaceutical Care Man-
agement Association lobbying group and 
some PBM executives believe the 
amendment will actually increase pre-
scription drug costs, because it would 
(Managing PBMs,’ Continued on page 14) 
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of medical training: 
Admission of errors is difficult 
for physicians.  Historically phy-
sicians in residency training have 
trained in a culture where disclo-
sure to peers is considered a sign 
of weakness.  Instead skill in 
“roundsmanship” is valued, that 
is, creative and contemporaneous 
responses to cover deficiencies 
or errors when reporting to more 
senior physicians.37 
“Medical narcissism” is defined as the 
need of health professionals to preserve 
their self esteem leading to the compro-
mise of error disclosure to patients.38  
Additionally, there is “an atmosphere in 
health care that can breed narcissistic incli-
nations and attitudes that make it very 
difficult to disclose medical errors truth-
fully and ethically.”39  Consequently, this 
“narcissism” creates a significant psycho-
logical barrier in allowing physicians to 
acknowledge that they could have com-
mitted an error, which in turn leads to the 
“phenomenon of medical error conceal-
ment” and other efforts to obscure the 
occurrence and facts related to the error.40  
The “rationalizing” of errors by medical 
professionals is another mechanism 
(‘To Tell or Not to Tell,’ Continued on page 15) 
Full disclosure of an error includes a 
description of the error, an acknowledge-
ment of responsibility, and an apology.34  
But a careful choice of words may be 
used to subvert this disclosure by not 
informing the patient of the actual error 
that occurred and the full extent of the 
effect on his or her health.35  Another 
study estimated that nationwide, physi-
cians are only disclosing errors to pa-
tients about one-third of the time.36  
These studies demonstrate the great dis-
connect between the ideals that support 
error disclosure and its actual perform-
ance.  
Reasons for Non-disclosure of   
Errors  
The psychological underpinnings 
that cause physicians to resist disclosing 
medical errors to patients are complex 
and can be traced to the basic structure 
give manufacturers and pharmacies more 
leverage in the negotiation of pricing, 
reducing the margins realized by the 
PBMs.52 
Whatever the immediate impact of 
the Cantwell or similar amendments on 
drug prices may be, patients and benefit 
providers still stand to benefit from the 
effect of healthcare reform on the PBM 
industry.  For example, transparency 
should also promote savings by reducing 
the need to “litigate challenges to egre-
gious, deceptive and anticompetitive 
PBM conduct.”53  Benefit providers have 
also followed the lead of Congress by 
taking immediate action and lobbying 
PBMs themselves, with nearly sixty large 
employers banding together to demand 
greater transparency from PBMs54 via the 
previously favored private contracting 
method.55  Finally, even in the event that 
drug prices increase incrementally, a large 
number of patients—formerly cash pay-
ors and now members of PBM-managed 
plans under the AHFA reforms—will still 
see their drug prices fall by as much as 
fifty percent.56 
None of these secondary benefits 
should overshadow the ultimate goal and 
likely consequence of the transparency 
measures: to pass more of the rebate sav-
ings along to drug purchasers.  Ultimately, 
this transparency measure, when incorpo-
rated into the broader healthcare reform 
initiative, would benefit both big business 
and small patient.  Pharmacy benefit man-
agers are good at what they do—
negotiating the middle of the pharmaceu-
tical supply chain to bring savings to bene-
fit providers and patients.  Congress 
should leverage this expertise and ensure 
that healthcare reform provides access to 
PBMs and increased rebate savings for all 
patients.  In exchange, enlarging the role 
of PBMs in the healthcare marketplace 
will provide significant new profit-making 
opportunities for the industry, which in-
vestors are already recognizing.  Undoubt-
edly, the result of this reform would be a 
mutually beneficial relationship, and the 
foundation of this mutually beneficial 
relationship will be transparency.  ☼   
‘To Tell or Not to Tell,’ Continued 
“CONSEQUENTLY, THIS ‘[MEDICAL] 
NARCISSISM’ CREATES A SIGNIFICANT 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIER IN ALLOW-
ING PHYSICIANS TO ACKNOWLEDGE 
THAT THEY COULD HAVE COMMITTED 
AN ERROR, WHICH IN TURN LEADS TO 
THE ‘PHENOMENON OF MEDICAL ER-
ROR CONCEALMENT’ AND OTHER EF-
FORTS TO OBSCURE THE OCCURRENCE 
AND FACTS RELATED TO THE ERROR.” 
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‘To Tell or Not to Tell,’ Continued 
whereby the significance of the error is 
minimized by terming it as an “incident,” 
by stating that it did not conclusively 
result in harm to the patient, and, if harm 
did occur, that it was minimal and not 
“anybody’s fault.”41 
The primary factor that is widely 
understood to limit full error disclosure is 
a fear of resultant medical malpractice 
lawsuits.42  A landmark study suggested, 
however, that non-disclosure of errors is 
more likely to lead patients to change 
physicians and seek legal advice regarding 
the errors.43  In contrast to patients re-
porting that error disclosure would be 
unlikely to lead them to sue for medical 
malpractice are the results of recent fi-
nancial risk analyses using mathematical 
modeling to evaluate the financial risks 
associated with error disclosure.  While 
conceding that disclosure of medical er-
rors is “the ethically right thing to do,” 
the authors of the study concluded that 
disclosing errors would likely prompt 
patients to sue, resulting in increases in 
medical malpractice costs.44  Nonetheless, 
it is questionable whether a desire to 
avoid financial responsibility for mistakes 
is a valid basis for abandoning an ethical 
obligation.  
Other significant factors contribut-
ing to non-disclosure include concerns 
about loss of reputation and referrals, the 
desire of physicians to remain self-
regulated, and the fear of retribution for 
reporting.45  While there are many reasons 
for non-disclosure of errors, none of these 
negate the basic ethical imperative for 
disclosure. 
Possible Effects of the PSA   
In 1999, an Institute of Medicine 
publication reported that as many as 
ninety-eight thousand Americans die in 
hospitals each year as a result of medical 
error.46  Viewed in the context of the sig-
nificant biases that afflict voluntary re-
porting of adverse events, these statistics 
may have represented an under-
reporting.47  Since the publication of this 
report, issues of patient safety and medical 
error reporting have received a great deal 
of attention from the medical community. 
The effects of legal mandates on 
medical error disclosure and eventually 
patient safety are yet to be fully under-
stood.  In theory, the PSA should result in 
an increase in the number of error disclo-
sures to patients and to DHHS.  There 
may be no effective way, however, of vali-
dating that this is indeed occurring.  Cer-
tain occurrences fall within well-defined 
classifications of “serious preventable 
adverse events,” such as burns sustained 
by a patient while undergoing surgery or 
errors in blood transfusions.48  Other 
“incidents,” such as the one described 
above where a patient dies following at-
tempts to suction blood from around the 
heart, may be “rationalized” as “no one’s 
fault.”49  Truly egregious errors are likely 
to go unreported due to concerns of liabil-
ity and fears of negative publicity follow-
ing reporting to DHSS.  Hence, in the 
absence of independent monitoring, the 
mandated disclosure of errors will not 
necessarily ensure the compliance of 
healthcare providers and hospitals.  
Conclusions  
The creation of a law requiring dis-
closure of medical errors in New Jersey 
indicates that the legislature does not con-
sider valid any reasons put forward for 
non-disclosure.  Data collected through 
the mandatory reporting system can iden-
tify the factors that lead to medical errors 
and in turn eliminate or minimize these 
factors as far as feasible.  Additionally, 
patients are provided information to make 
informed choices about future medical 
care.  The effect that this law will have on 
the frequency of medical malpractice suits 
remains debatable.50  Enactment of the 
PSA is a significant step toward mandat-
ing transparency in healthcare.  Whether a 
law can truly bring about the desired 
transparency and result in improved pa-
tient safety remains to be seen.  ☼ 
“WHILE THERE ARE MANY REASONS 
FOR NON-DISCLOSURE OF ERRORS, 
NONE OF THESE NEGATE THE BASIC 
ETHICAL  IMPERATIVE  FOR             
DISCLOSURE.” 
 “Yes, we disclose. . . .”    © Neatly Chiseled Features, used with permission 
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Student Contributors 
Diana Giampiccolo is a first-year student with an interest in health law.  She 
graduated from Seton Hall University in May 2009 with a B.A. in English and 
a minor in Russian and East European Studies.  From 2006 to 2009, she 
worked as a personal injury and real estate paralegal at Spector Foerst & As-
sociates in Millburn, New Jersey.  
Sarah Geers will graduate in May with a concentration in intellectual prop-
erty and a continuing interest in health law.  Prior to law school, she worked 
as a pharmaceutical scientist at Merck & Co., Inc., where she developed drug 
formulations for clinical trials and marketed products.  She interned in the 
Merck Patent Department first while working as a research scientist and later 
while at Seton Hall.  Last summer, she was a summer associate at Cravath, 
Swaine & Moore LLP in New York, where she will return in 2011.  
Nicole Hamberger, a 2L, graduated from Gettysburg College in 2008 with 
an English major and a Writing minor. In the summer of 2009, she completed 
a legal externship at St. Michael’s Medical Center in Newark, New Jersey.  In 
college, she assisted in medical malpractice and personal injury cases as an 
intern for two summers at Gold Albanese & Barletti in Morristown, New Jer-
sey, and for one summer at Wolf Block Brach Eichler in Roseland, New Jer-
sey.  
Nicole Ho is a third-year student interested in health law and intellectual 
property law. Prior to law school, Nicole worked as a research associate at 
Bristol-Myers Squibb and Merck Research Labs.  She specialized in early drug 
discovery, specifically oncology research.  While at Seton Hall, Nicole in-
terned at Merck’s patent department and at the intellectual property law firm 
Lerner, David, Littenberg, Krumholz & Mentlik.  Nicole will continue as an 
associate at LDLKM when she graduates from Seton Hall Law in May. 
Dr. Neelu Pal is a first-year law student and a board-certified general sur-
geon who completed residency training in 2005 at University of Medicine and 
Dentistry in Newark.  She went on to complete fellowship training in bariatric 
surgery at University Medical Center at Princeton in 2007.  She is currently 
self-employed and in the process of starting a private practice in Jersey City.  
She believes that the law and medicine are based on similar profound ethical 
principles and is interested in this confluence and the impact that it has on 
healthcare delivery.  She is especially interested in the areas of patient safety, 
fraud and abuse, and drug and device law. 
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Health Law Forum News 
The NY Health and Hospital Corporation 
Newark, NJ—October 5, 2009 
On October 5, 2009, the Health Law Forum hosted 
guest speaker Stacy-Ann Christian, J.D., M.P.H., who 
discussed her role as the Senior Director of the Office of 
Clinical and Health Services Research at the New York City 
Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC).  As part of the 
Health Law Forum’s ongoing speaker series, Stacy-Ann 
Christian spoke at length about her current work and the 
many capacities it entails including lawyer, administrator, 
policy expert, and businesswoman.   
Ms. Christian provided a brief overview about her 
educational and professional background. After law school, 
she first clerked for an Essex County judge and then entered 
private practice.  Upon completion of her Master of Public 
Health degree, she went in-house at a pharmaceutical 
company.  After obtaining extensive contracting experience, 
Ms. Christian joined HHC.  At HHC, she is responsible for 
managing all legal and contractual aspects of pharmaceutical 
and medical device studies conducted at the thirteen hospital 
and healthcare facilities that are part of HHC.  Ms. Christian 
described how such wide-ranging responsibility entails the 
ability to understand the human and business aspects of 
research contract negotiations; on one end are the research 
subjects, who are typically uninsured or underinsured and 
whom HHC is charged with serving, and on the other is the 
need to advance research and ensure that HHC is able to 
receive funding so that it can continue to provide its services.   
Ms. Christian finally discussed her experience obtaining 
the M.P.H. degree, particularly noting that the team-based 
teaching method broadened her highly technical and 
analytical law-school thinking processes.  At the same time, 
she explained that having her law degree helped her analyze 
public health problems in a more practical matter than some 
of her counterparts in the degree program.  She further 
noted that the M.P.H. has been highly marketable, providing 
opportunities to pursue a career spanning both policy and 
law.  
The Health Law Forum would like to thank Ms. 
Christian for taking the time to speak about her experiences 
and for providing advice and opportunities in the field.  The 
Health Law Forum is proud to work in partnership with 
such a valuable health law resource.  ☼ 
Launch of the Health Law Forum Website  
The Health Law Forum is excited to announce the launch of 
our website: www.healthlawforum.com. This site is entirely student
-run and serves as a hub to both the Health Law Forum and the 
Health Law Outlook.  At the site you can find all of the previous 
Health Law Outlook publications, as well as a calendar of the Health 
Law Forum’s future events.  We continuously update the site with 
information, including outlines for classes related to health law, 
links to other health law-related websites and blogs, and discus-
sions and summaries of Health Law Forum events as they occur 
throughout the semester.  Our hope is that the site will foster stu-
dent collaboration and discussion, as well as networking opportu-
nities in the field of health law.  ☼ 
Matthew McKennan ☼  matthew.mckennan@student.shu.edu 
www.HealthLawForum.com 
HLF Director of Online 
Development Jordan 
Cohen (left) and HLF 
Vice President Matt 
McKennan (right) wel-
come incoming health 
law students at new 
student orientation in 
August.  Copies of the 
Health Law Outlook 
were distributed to 
new 1Ls, who fre-
quently contribute to 
the HLO in their first 
semester. 
 Student Health Law Conference 
Newark, NJ—October 16, 2009 
On Friday, October 16, 2009, Seton Hall Law hosted the Third Annual Student Health Law 
Conference.  The conference was co-sponsored by Seton Hall Law and the American Society of 
Law, Medicine & Ethics (ASLME).  Students from law schools across the country attended the day
-long event to explore career opportunities in the field of health law.  Associate Dean Kathleen 
Boozang kicked off the conference with an entertaining and far-reaching explanation about the 
scope of a health lawyer’s responsibilities.  Her introduction touched on the role of corporate 
counsel at non-profit hospitals, issues of fraud and abuse encountered by government attorneys, 
and the role of lawyers in international health policy debates involving healthcare provision under a 
totalitarian regime.   
Soon after Dean Boozang’s charge, students attended various panels throughout the Seton 
Hall Law campus.  Each panel was composed of distinguished professionals in the health law field, 
including several Seton Hall alumni.  Practitioners from various organizations and institutions in-
cluding the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Gibbons P.C., Johnson & Johnson, 
and Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey provided career advice and guidance.  The panel sessions 
covered such topics as Pharmaceutical In-house Counsel, Health Information Technology, Starting 
Your Own Health Law Related Business, and Obtaining an L.L.M. in health law.  
Each panel session included a brief overview by the panelists about their journey and experience in health law. Panelists also 
fielded questions from students.  Common questions included topics such as how to get your “foot in the door”, whether or not a 
scientific background is helpful in the pursuit of health law, and what areas of health law are emerging or bound for growth in the 
future.  Panelists offered a broad range of suggestions and valuable insight. For instance, the panel of in-house counsel recom-
mended, as a practical matter, working in a private firm or government position before making the transition in-house.  The panel 
regarding government enforcement stressed internships at local levels and the potentially tremendous impact of federal regulation 
reform on future practice.  Overall, the panel discussions illuminated the viability of a health law career even during a shaky eco-
nomic climate due primarily to the growing breadth of health-related laws and regulations at both the state and federal level.  The day 
ended with one final opportunity to meet fellow students, faculty, and panelists during a networking reception in the Seton Hall Law 
Atrium.   
Overall, the conference was an overwhelming success.  As evidenced by 
the quality, number, and diversity of panelists and students in attendance, 
the program provided an excellent opportunity to explore the field of 
health law and to meet current and future colleagues across the spectrum 
of health law practice.  ☼ 
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More HLF News 
Blood Drive 
Newark, NJ—October 13, 2009 
The fall semester blood drive was a tremendous success, thanks to 
volunteers from the Public Interest Network and the Health Law Forum.  
The drive was organized by HLF secretary Nicole Ho and was sponsored 
by the American Red Cross.  Students donated  in the Multipurpose 
Room of the law school and were treated to snacks and beverages.  The 
fifty-one donations will help save 153 lives.  Please join us when the Red 
Cross returns again next semester for the spring semester blood drive.  ☼ 
Conference attendees mingle at the networking re-
ception in the law school atrium. 
One of many panel discussions 
at the Student Health Law 
Conference. 
HLF 2009-2010 Executive Board: 
Matthew Colford (3L), President 
Matthew McKennan (2L), Vice President 
Kaitlin Semler (3L), Treasurer 
Nicole Ho (3L), Secretary 
Jordan Cohen (2L), Dir. Online Devel.  
Sarah Geers (3L), Co-VP, HLO 
Maansi Raswant (2L), Co-VP, HLO 
Timothy Norton (3L), HLO Editor 
Renee Levine (1L), SBA Rep. 
Stephanie Mazzaro (1L), SBA Rep. 
Faculty Advisor: 
Professor Carl Coleman 
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Health Law Forum News 
The opinions expressed herein are solely opinions of the authors and not of Seton Hall University School of Law or the Health Law Forum.  This newsletter and articles 
herein are licensed under a Creative Commons non-commercial use/attribution/share-alike license.  For further information, consult the Creative Commons website.   
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Speaker discussing the roles attorneys play in the 
coordination of research studies in hospitals and 
other healthcare organizations. 
Analysis of the current H1N1 pandemic, including 
its impact on a global, national, and regional level. 
Fall blood drive, co-sponsored by the Public Interest 
Network. 
Faculty discussion regarding student course selection 
for next semester. 
Launch of the new Health Law Forum website. 
About the Health Law Forum 
The Health Law Forum  is a student organization at 
Seton Hall Law School for those interested in health 
law.   
The Health Law Forum hosts speakers, panel discus-
sions, community service projects, and networking 
events throughout each academic year.  
The Health Law Outlook (HLO), a subsidiary of the 
Health Law Forum for students interested in health pol-
icy, hosts regular round-table discussions about current 
topics in the healthcare field.  Each semester, HLO pre-
sents healthcare issues using debate, brain-storming, 
presentation, and Socratic method formats.  Many of the 
articles included in newsletters are the product of these 
meetings and discussion. 
This semester’s HLO and HLF meetings and events      
included 
Contact us at SHU.Outlook@gmail.com 
Visit our website at www.HealthLawForum.com 
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